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IN THE COURT OP APPEALS 
OF 
THE STATE OP UTAH 
DOUGLAS J. ALLRED and 
GEORGE S. DIUMENTI, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellees, 
vs. 
LARRY H. BROWN and 
ARTHUR J. RITTER, 
Defendant and 
Appellant 
Case No. 93-0815 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT 
LARRY H. BROWN 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING. 
(Case Below No. C-86-090-3354) 
Defendant/appellant Larry H. Brown ("Brown") by and 
through counsel, submits the following Reply Brief of 
Appellant in response to the brief of plaintiffs/appellees 
Douglas J. Allred and George S. Diumenti (collectively 
"Diumenti"). 
RESPONSE TO DIUMENTI'S 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Statement of Issues 
The issues as raised by Diumenti's brief and responded 
to herein are properly stated as: 
1. Is the trial court prevented from finding Brown 
liable for damages to the airplane pursuant to an allegedly 
expressed term of a bailment agreement between Diumenti and 
Brown, specifying that Brown obtain insurance for the 
airplane, when the trial court had already concluded that no 
contract of any type existed between Diumenti and Brown 
because according to Diumenti's own admissions, all of 
Diumenti's dealings concerning the airplane were with 
defendant Ritter? 
2. Is the trial court prevented from finding Brown 
liable for damages to the airplane pursuant to an alleged 
bailment agreement without a determination that Brown was 
negligent as required by Utah common law and the instruc-
tions on remand given by this Court? 
3. Is the trial court prevented from finding Brown 
liable for damages to the airplane pursuant to an alleged 
bailment agreement when, for the same reasons that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish an expressed, implied or 
quasi contract between Diumenti and Brown there is insuf-
ficient evidence to establish a bailment agreement between 
the two? 
II. Standard of Review 
Brown's response to Diumenti's brief raises purely 
legal issues. As a result, this Court should not defer to 
the trial court's conclusions concerning these issues and 
should review its determinations for correctness. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
1 
RESPONSE TO DIUMENTI'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To response to Diumenti's statement of the facts, Brown 
primarily relies upon the ruling that the lower court made 
after Diumenti presented his case in chief at trial — that 
11
 [b]y Mr. Diumenti's own admission" there was no contract of 
any sort between Diumenti and Brown — specifically that 
there was no agreement regarding insurance for the airplane. 
Primary Transcript at 73-74. Because all dealings, 
negotiations and agreements regarding the airplane took 
place between Diumenti and Ritter exclusively, the trial 
court dismissed Diumenti's breach of contract claim against 
Brown. As Diumenti's counsel conceded, "I think Mr. 
Diumenti's testimony was unequivocal that his agreement 
specifically was with Mr. Ritter." Id. 
Indeed, when Diumenti's counsel argued at trial that "I 
think there was no1 collateral agreement with Mr. Brown that 
the plane wouldn't be flown unless — that he would not fly 
the airplane unless he made — found the appropriate rider 
from the insurance company," the trial court discarded this 
argument as well: 
That doesn't square with your pleadings. You 
would have to — you would want to amend your 
pleadings to conform with the evidence. You are 
[now] claiming there was agreement entered May 8 
with both these parties that they would provide 
insurance coverage for any losses occasioned to 
that aircraft Cessna 414. 
1
 Diumenti now chooses to interpret this "no" in the 
transcript as an "an", completely changing the meaning of 
the sentence. Diumenti's Brief at 15. 
2 
Because there was no such agreement on May 8 — the day 
before the crash — between Diumenti and Brown concerning 
providing insurance for the airplane, the trial court 
concluded that "[t]he motion to dismiss as to Mr. Brown, the 
first cause of action [the contract claim] will be granted." 
As this Court determined, because the lower court 
dismissed the cause of action for breach of contract against 
Brown at trial, the principles of justice prevent Diumenti 
for asserting this claim again. Memorandum Decision of this 
Court at 3-4, exhibit "a" attached to Brown7s Brief. The 
trial court already ruled that no agreement existed obli-
gating Brown "to insure and maintain insurance on the air-
craft in favor of plaintiffs" and therefore Brown was not 
liable to Diumenti for any failure to "obtain insurance." 
Diumenti's Complaint at 1-2 (First Cause of Action), exhibit 
"1" attached to Brown's Brief. The trial court ruled that 
Brown was not responsible for "a breach of [the] agreement 
with plaintiffs" to obtain insurance. Id. 
Relying upon the trial court's ruling and this Court's 
insistence that Brown is not liable to Diumenti for a breach 
of contract concerning insurance for the airplane, Brown 
responds to Diumenti's statement of facts as follows: 
Brown's Response to J 3: Diumenti misleadingly 
portrays Brown's role in the management of Mercury Air 
Courier Service ("Mercury"). While Brown did help run the 
3 
company, his position was that of "operations officer." 
Primary Trial Transcript at 5-6. Brown's job was to fly the 
company's airplanes while Ritter, as the business manager of 
Mercury, took care of the routine business functions of the 
company, including "contracting for aircraft" for the 
company to use. Id. at 77. Accordingly, the trial court 
concluded that as operations manager and pilot of the 
airplane, Brown was not party to any contract concerning the 
leasing of or obtaining insurance for the aircraft. 
Brown's Response to ^ 6: Diumenti misleads this Court 
when he suggests that Brown was a party to the informal 
discussions in Ritter's living room at which insurance for 
the airplane was discussed in any more that the most general 
terms. Although insurance was discussed at this preliminary 
meeting, Brown repeatedly emphasized that the conversation 
there was general and uncertain and that no details were 
worked out. Primary Transcript at 3 5-3 6. Thus, any quotes 
from Brown's testimony concerning this meeting must be 
qualified with the witness' further testimony that the 
discussions were only in the most general terms and the 
trial court's determination that no contract — expressed, 
implied, or quasi — existed between Diumenti and Brown. 
Brown's Response to J 7: Furthermore, Diumenti 
testified that the agreement reached at the meeting was 
"that Mr. Ritter would lease the aircraft in consideration -
- the consideration that he would pay would be as follows:" 
4 
Partial Transcript at 10 (emphasis added). Diumenti also 
stated that his discussion were "predominately with Mr. 
Ritter" and that "Mr. Ritter was the lessee" of the 
airplane, Id. at 33, and that "[t]he lease wasn't, in my 
understanding, was not with Mr. Brown, that's correct" and 
that "Mr. Brown essentially said, xI'm going to be flying 
the plane for Mr. Ritter.'" Id. at 52. Diumenti's testi-
mony continually supports the determination of the trial 
court that Diumenti's contract claim against Brown was 
without merit. 
Brown's Response to 5 8: Diumenti misdirects this 
Court by implying that the statement he quotes refers to 
some agreement between himself and Brown. Importantly, 
immediately before giving the testimony at issue, Diumenti 
confirmed that Mr. Ritter was the lessee of the airplane and 
Mr. Ritter "was the one that was going to comply with the 
terms of the lease and pay the hundred dollars an hour." 
Partial Transcript at 33. Diumenti also stated at trial 
that it was his understanding (rather than the understanding 
of "the parties" as Diumenti now represents in 5 8) that 
"the basis upon which . . . [he] was willing to lease the 
aircraft was [that] the individual for Mr. Ritter that would 
be flying the aircraft would be added to our policy. . . . " 
Id. This statement underscores that Diumenti believed that 
Brown had no role in the lease of the aircraft. Brown was 
not even specifically named in the discussion and was 
5 
referred to only as Ritter's agent — the one who would fly 
the airplane. 
Brown's Response to 5 9: Diumenti misleads this Court 
when he gives significance to his testimony that Brown 
"acknowledged" "what he had to do to get his waiver on that 
policy . . ." Actually, Diumenti testified that Brown 
never told him that Brown would do anything concerning 
getting insurance for the airplane. While Diumenti testi-
fied that Brown said he would be the only person to fly the 
airplane, Diumenti also agreed that Brown never stated that 
Brown would have any other part in the fulfillment of the 
terms of the lease. Partial Transcript at 50-51.2 Diumenti 
emphasized again that it was "absolutely correct" that any 
2
 The testimony at issue was: 
Q: Okay. Now, the meeting on the 29th at 
Ritter's house, during that meeting did Mr. Brown 
make any representations to you that he would do 
anything as part of the lease? 
A (Diumenti): Yes. That he would be the only 
person to fly the aircraft after being added to 
the policy. 
Q: Anything else? 
A: Anything else he would do? 
Q: Correct. 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Mr. Brown didn't say to you, "I'll go get the 
rider and get insurance coverage? 
A: He didn't say that in those words. He said he 
understood what he had to do to get his waiver on 
that policy, just like Paul Johnson, one of his 
pilot acquaintances, had done. 
Q: Okay. So Mr. Brown said he understood. My 
question to you, though, is did Mr. Brown say, 
"I'll do that"? 
A: On Sunday he didn't say he would do that. 
Partial Transcript at 50-51. 
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lease concerning the airplane was with Ritter, not Brown. 
Id. at 52. 
Brown's Response to J 14: Diumenti misguides this 
Court when he takes this portion of Brown's testimony out of 
context. After confirming that Mercury required written 
agreements for all the aircraft which it leased, Brown was 
asked whether he knew "the arrangements had been worked out 
with regard to the repairs" that were made on the airplane. 
Brown replied that he knew of the agreement concerning the 
repairs only in general terms because it was Ritter's duty 
as business agent to take care of the details of the 
arrangement for repairing the airplane. Thus, when Brown 
replied that he had no reason to doubt that there was an 
enforceable oral agreement in effect at the time the 
airplane was being repair, he was referring to an agreement 
concerning repairs — not concerning the lease of the 
aircraft or providing insurance. Full Transcript at 225. 
Brown's Response to 5 16: Diumenti misleads this Court 
when he cites the Finding of Fact from the first trial court 
ruling to assert that Ritter and Brown "expressly agreed to 
take steps to be added to plaintiff's insurance coverage or 
to provide their own coverage, which they failed to do." 
Diumenti cites the decision and findings of the trial which 
dealt with the issue of a contract between the parties 
concerning the airplane and which was explicitly overturned 
by this Court with regard to Brown. As this Court concluded 
7 
in the first appeal, the trial "court erred when, after dis-
missing the first cause of action for breach of contract, it 
concluded that Brown was liable to plaintiffs for breach of 
contract." Memorandum and Decision of this Court at 3. 
Brown's Response to 5 209 [sic]: While Diumenti quotes 
-- with an air of disbelief — Brown's statements that Brown 
assumed that the airplane was insured and that he did not 
inquire as to whether the airplane was insured, Diumenti 
does not cite or quote any passage from his testimony (nor 
does such a passage exist) that Diumenti, like Brown, did 
anything more than assume that the airplane was insured or 
that Diumenti ever inquired as to whether the airplane was 
insuredo 
INTRODUCTION 
In his opening brief, Brown showed that the trial court 
erred when it determined that Brown was liable for damage to 
the airplane pursuant to a bailment that included an express 
agreement to obtain insurance for the airplane. As Brown 
demonstrated, the ruling was wrong because 1) the trial 
court could not find Brown a party to an expressed insurance 
provision pursuant to a bailment agreement when it had 
already determined that no contract existed between Diumenti 
and Brown — much less an expressed agreement; 2) the trial 
court could not find Brown liable for damage to the airplane 
under a bailment theory because it did not follow this 
Court's instructions and the requirements of Utah common law 
8 
that it make a finding of Brown's negligence before holding 
him liable for damage to the airplane; 3) there is insuf-
ficient evidence to show that any expressed agreement con-
cerning insurance existed between Diumenti and Brown; and 
finally, 4) Diumenti offered no evidence that Brown was 
negligent and Brown proved that he exercised the requisite 
care of the airplane, the trial court could not hold Brown 
liable for damages to the aircraft. 
In reply to these points, Diumenti relies on the fruit-
less argument that by reserving Diumenti's third cause of 
action — his bailment claim — the trial court could still 
make a finding that an expressed insurance agreement existed 
between Diumenti and Brown even though the trial court had 
already ruled that no agreement existed between Diumenti and 
Brown. Because the general common law duties of parties to 
a bailment can be altered by an express term, Diumenti 
argues, an express agreement between Diumenti and Brown 
makes Brown liable for damages to the airplane even though 
the he was not negligent. Diumenti argues that simply 
because the trial court did not rule on the bailment claim 
at trial, that it reserved the option to again contradict 
its prior ruling and determine that an alleged bailment 
between the parties included an expressed insurance agree-
ment. 
9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As Brown demonstrates conclusively below, Diumenti's 
arguments fail. First, Diumenti ignores a central principle 
of the law of bailments. Although an expressed agreement 
between the parties to a bailment can alter their duties as 
fixed by law, such an agreement must be expressed in "clear 
and unmistakable language" and must be assented to by both 
parties. Accordingly, the failure of a bailee to obtain 
agreed upon insurance is considered a breach of contract. 
As a result, absent a precise and indisputable contract that 
the bailee is to obtain insurance, the courts will not hold 
the bailee liable for damage caused to the bailed property 
unless she is negligent. 
This tenet of the common law of bailments readily shows 
Diumenti's error. The trial court dismissed Diumenti's 
breach of contract claim against Brown because there was 
insufficient dealings and understandings between Diumenti 
and Brown to create an agreement. Given this reasoning, the 
trial court necessarily dismissed the possibility that there 
was a clear and distinct expressed agreement — mutually 
assented to by Diumenti and Brown — that the latter would 
obtain insurance for the airplane. Where there is no 
contract of any sort, there cannot be a clear and unmis-
takable agreement, mutually assented to by the contracting 
parties, concrete enough to impose an obligation on Brown 
contrary to that fixed by law. 
10 
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cannot rule that Brown is liable for damages to the bailed 
property. For these reason, all of Diumenti's claims 
against Brown should be dismissed. 
Brown demonstrates each of these points in detail 
below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. By Dismissing Diumenti's Breach of Contract Claim 
Against Brown, The Trial Court Necessarily Ruled That There 
Could Not Be An Expressed Insurance Agreement Between Them. 
A. The Trial Court Ruled That No Agreement Was Made Between 
Diumenti And Brown Because Diumenti Bargained With Ritter 
Exclusively. 
At trial, the lower court dismissed Diumenti's breach 
of contract claim against Brown, concluding that there was 
no enforceable contract between Diumenti and Brown.3 The 
3
 There is some suggestion in the transcript that the 
trial court ruled only that there was no express contract 
between Diumenti and Brown and that because Diumenti had not 
plead a breach of an implied contract, the breach of con-
tract claim was meritless as against Brown. This inter-
pretation of the trial court ruling does not make sense. A 
breach of contract claim can be founded on an expressed, 
implied, or quasi contract regardless of whether the plain-
tiff specified in her complaint which type of contract 
formed the basis of defendant's legal obligations. Thus, 
when the trial court dismissed Diumenti's contract claim 
against Brown, it dismissed the possibility that any type of 
bargain or agreement concerning insurance existed between 
the two. 
Furthermore, this distinction is largely academic 
since, as Brown demonstrates below, a bailor and a bailee 
must expressly agree to alter their common law duties under 
the bailment relationship. It is clear, at least, that the 
trial court dismissed the claim that Diumenti entered into 
an express agreement with Brown. Thus, even if the trial 
court reserved the possibility that an implied agreement 
existed between Diumenti and Brown, any such agreement would 
not be sufficiently robust to permit a deviation for the 
legal obligations imposed by common law on parties to a 
12 
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4 whj_ie the trial court originally dismissed the 
breach of contract claim against Brown during trial, in its 
first Memorandum Decision after trial, it found that Ritter 
and Brown had breached the oral contract to obtain insurance 
for the aircraft. The relevant portion of the Memorandum 
Decision of the Trial Court reads: 
• • 
2. The oral agreement between the parties was 
that defendants agreed either to take steps to be 
added to plaintiff's insurance, or to obtain their 
own insurance policy, either of which would 
provide coverage for their use of the aircraft, 
1 3 
the claim that Diumenti had entered into an oral contract 
with Brown, the trial court determined that Brown had no 
enforceable obligation to obtain insurance for the airplane. 
Because a contract is an agreement enforceable in law which 
assigns obligation to the parties of the contract, the trial 
court determined that no such understanding and no such 
obligation existed between Diumenti and Brown. 
B. In Order To Alter Their Prescribed Duties Under A 
Bailment, The Bailor And Bailee Must Clearly And Unmis-
takably Contract To Modify Their Legal Relationship. 
Well settled law mandates that, unless otherwise 
obligated by express contract, a bailee is not an insurer of 
the safety of goods delivered into her keeping. Memorandum 
Decision of this Court at 3, citing Sumsion v. Streator-
Smith, Inc. 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680, 685-686 (1943); 
Barlow Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 901 
(Utah 1975) ("bailee has a duty to exercise reasonable care 
and caution commensurate with acceptance of the respon-
sibility of safekeeping the property of others entrusted to 
3. Defendants breached the agreement to provide 
insurance as required. . . . 
Memorandum Decision of the Trial Court at 2. 
On appeal, this Court reversed that decision, ruling 
that the dismissal of the breach of contract claim against 
Brown during trial constituted an adjudication of the matter 
and precluded the trial court from finding Brown liable on 
the contract theory resurrected after trial. 
14 
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c ::»i istr i icti oi i, i : sfi isi i ig t ::) \ ipl: 10] d ] i abi ] i t;y ] :! mi ta t::i < :: i is as 
posted at a parcel room and wri tten, oi i plaintiff's receipt 
when a checkroom, company negligently gave p] ai ntif f' s 
c h e c k e d b a g !:  • :) a n o t h e r p e r s o n A11 e n J S o u t h e r n P a c i f . c 
Co. , 213 P.2d 6 6 7 (Utah 19 5 0 ) , The Coi irt noted that 
the parties may enter into a val id agreement to 
modify the obligations which wou \s\ otherwise arise 
^ See also, Brown's Brief at 28-11 where this point is 
argued extens ively. 
from the relationship of bailor and bailee if [the 
agreement] *does not violate the law or contravene 
public policy, and so long as it is actually a 
part of the contract of bailment and is expressed 
in clear and unmistakable language.' 
Id. at 668, quoting 6 Am. Jur. Bailments, § 176. 
Understandably, the courts require that, to be enforce-
able, an agreement which alters the legal duties of the 
bailor and bailee by requiring the bailee to insure the 
property at issue, must be an actual contract. Thus, when a 
contract precisely and undoubtedly calls for the bailee to 
insure the bailed property, and he fails to do so, the 
bailor can recover only on the basis of a breach of contract 
claim. For example, once a bailee has fulfilled her obli-
gation to insure, she is not responsible for any deficiency 
occurring because, for example, of the insolvency of insur-
ance company. Williamson v. Phillipoff, 64 So. 269 (Fla. 
1914); Re Farmers State Bank. 289 N.W. 75 (S.D. 1939); see 
also Texas Van Lines v. Godfrey, 313 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1958) (liability not predicated on theory that bailee 
was insurer of property, but on theory that bailee breached 
its contract to obtain insurance coverage); 8 Am.Jur. 2d, 
Bailments § 216. 
Examination of the applicable case law proves that a 
bailee's failure to fulfill a binding promise to obtain 
insurance is a breach of contract. For example, in Texas 
Van Lines, plaintiffs recovered only the amount of the 
promised insurance coverage rather than the actual value of 
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their furn *" *~ en wds aest. 
exp] ai ned +°y i F* no+" nt.-s^at. ; . theory that 
[Texas Van - <:v:e insurer • predicated ^ 
theory tha ^^a^ van Linebj ureached 
isurancp coverage "for- r _ . Texas 
Van Lines v. Godfrey, * \ < , :. i i :. f 
this analy:=>jL! ^ n i t n i s were er 0 
~ the amount Insurance coverage tor which the parties 
contracted C •,. , . M«. ictual value of the 
destroyed cjods. Ay n| i miC i rms a 
bailee's; agreement t\ _,.•.. .;....•; J «J.-. concrete as any 
enforceable contract or binding promise. 
C. Having Already Ruled That There Was No Contract Between 
Diumenti and Brown, The Trial Court Could Not Find That The 
Parties Agreed To Alter Their Duties As Defined By The Law 
of Bailments. 
Under the law of bailments, an agreement to alter the 
legally impor.pd ilwti»»! »>1' 'nilur -.v"i hii IG':> must I.'*.1 a 
6
 Worthy of note i n th is action is the lack of any 
suggestion as to the amount insurance Brown was allegedly to 
be required to secure for the plane. Alternatively, was 
Brown only suppose to be added as a named pilot to 
Diumenti's insurance policy? For example, Findings of Fact 
of Trial Court at J 3, exhibit lfc" attached to Brown's 
Brief; Memorandum Decision of Trial Court at f 2, exhibit 
"b" attached to Brown's Brief. Absent an express and clear 
agreement, the common law duties of a bailment are not to be 
expanded or enlarged. The terms of alleged agreement as to 
insurance was not clear — was Brown to secure insurance or 
merely be added to Diumenti's policy? 
contract.7 Like a contract, such an agreement must be clear 
and distinct and mutually agreed to by the parties. 
Furthermore, because the common law assumes a certain 
relationship between the bailor and the bailee — that the 
bailee is not the insurer of the bailed property —- the 
courts will not lightly impose additional duties upon the 
bailee. Finally, any claim that the bailee failed to 
insured the bailed property as promised must be plead as a 
breach of contract. 
These legal principles show that there is nothing about 
a bailment relationship which suddenly obviates or lessens 
the burden of the complaining party to show that a true 
meeting of the minds existed and a legal obligation was 
created, before she can recover on the basis of an alter-
ation of the ordinary bailment agreement. As established 
above, an agreement to require the bailee to insure the 
bailed property cannot be implied — it must be clear and 
expressed. 
Accordingly, under the law of bailments, Diumenti is 
precluded from recovering from Brown on the basis of an 
expressed agreement between the parties that Brown obtain 
A contract is fl[a]n agreement . . . which creates an 
obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. . . . Its 
essentials are competent parties, subject matter, a legal 
consideration, mutuality of agreement and mutuality of obli-
gation." Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition). 
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insurance for the pi ane As a n a] 1 eg<= .d ba :i 1 ee,H Browi i i s 
requ i r e d on1y t o exercIs e due ca re i i i opera11on of the 
airplane, not to I nsure it Any deviation from this legally 
imposed obligation cannot be imp] i ed. Instea 
nati ve agreement must be a clear, unmistakable, mutually 
assented to, contract. Because the trial court already 
determined (and this Court- agreed) I h„it B n >wi i was : 1 a 
party to any contract concerning insurance and that Diumenti 
and Brown had i nsufficient contact with one and other to 
enter i nto a con trac t: the tri a] • :: ourt must" a I so cor ic] ude 
that Diumenti and Brown had insufficient deal, no 
another to alter their common :-aw )-ailment ;'• ationship, In 
sum, after mi i.siTii ssi nq the bn.j;i< 
Brown, 11 \e tri.il court Is prcc. --,• ::inding Brown 
liable on the basis of an expressed agreement as part of a 
bailment be two* "in the pdi'i i os 9 
8
 Brown has argued extensively that, for the same 
reasons that the trial court determined that there was no 
contract between Diumenti and Brown, there is insufficient 
evidence to establish a bailment between the two, .See, 
Brown's Brief at 21-23. 
9 ,jijie trial court clearly understood Diumenti # s breach 
of contract claim as involving the same elements and evi-
dence that his bailment evidence involved. Thus, before the 
first appeal, the trial court found, holding Brown liable 
for breach of contract, that the "oral agreement between the 
parties was that defendants agreed either to take steps to 
be added to plaintiff's insurance, or to obtain their own 
insurance policy, either of which would provide coverage for 
their use of the aircraft.11 First Memo, and Dec. at 2. 
After remand, the trial court merely plugged the word 
"bailment" into its previous holding, stating that "under 
the bailment, there was an express agreement between the 
parties that defendants would obtain insurance to cover the 
II. Giving Preclusive Effect To The Ruling That There Was 
No Insurance Agreement Between Diumenti and Brown and 
Requiring A Finding Of Negligence To Hold Brown Liable Under 
a Bailment Theory Is Consistent With This Court's Prior 
Ruling And The Ruling At Trial. 
Diumenti makes much of his argument that, because the 
trial court specifically reserved ruling on his bailment 
claim when it dismissed the breach of contract claim against 
Brown, it was free to subsequently determine Diumenti and 
Brown entered into a contract that expanded Brown's 
liability beyond that assumed by the law. This argument 
fails for two reasons. First, it ignores the instructions 
on remand given by this court that the trial court make a 
finding of negligence before it imposes liability on Brown 
under a bailment theory. On the first appeal, this Court 
rejected Diumenti7s argument that the trial court had based 
its ruling on his bailment claim rather than his previously 
dismissed breach of contract claim by stating: 
We recognize that the "relationship [between] 
bailor and bailee is created in contract." The 
[trial] court, however, did not refer to bailment 
in its memorandum decision, findings, or con-
clusions. Moreover, the court did not make any 
findings or conclusions concerning negligence 
which is the basis for liability in a cause of 
action for bailment. 
Memorandum Decision of this Court at 2-3, (emphasis added, 
citations omitted), exhibit "a" attached to Brown's Brief. 
airplane during the time the airplane was in the defendants 
[sic] possession." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
of Trial Court at 3. 
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Tint is, th i .s Coi ii : t has a] i: eadi ' 1 ie] d t::l: la t i i i 1 i ght :: 'f tl: le 
trial cour t' s dismissal of the contract claim,, the tr i al 
court must determine that Brown was negligent before r 
Tier it theor y • 
Secon making erroneous argument, Diumenti 
ignores v.-, principles idicata and issue preclusion 
nsurance agreement between Diumenti and Brown after 
r^i already dismissed the claim that Brovr . ntered into 
^:. ... ,.. - . •_ . .. . - Procedure 
': dismissal xoperates as an ji'udici :on of the 
~ . i M c - :ii si on i :: f 
-c,*>~ • • -ii . - ^ .-• •• fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of 
IUS: .cv iictate, once the trial court •--pally determined 
nent, :i t :i s 
prevented from finding Brown liable because he was party to 
an expressed insurance agreement. 
1(
 * Oddly, Diumenti suggests that because Brown did 
present evidence concerning bailment after the dismissal of 
the contract claim, he would not be prejudiced by the trial 
court's reversal its previous ruling of no contract. 
Diumenti's Brief at 17. However, Diumenti forgets that an 
expressed agreement which alters the bailment relationship 
is a contract. Thus, in reliance upon the trial court's 
dismissal, Brown did not offer evidence that he was not a 
party to an express agreement expanding his liability beyond 
the legally defined limits of a bailment relationship 
Brown would therefore be prejudiced i f the tri al court's 
present ruling is allowed to stand. 
Finally, Diumenti ignores the obvious conclusion that 
the trial court refused to dismiss Diumenti's bailment claim 
against Brown at the same time it dismissed his breach of 
contract claim because the trial court was undecided on the 
issue of negligence. Full Transcript at 75.n Because it 
was uncertain on the issue of negligence, the trial court 
deferred any decision concerning bailment until it could 
determine the care with which Brown operated the airplane. 
Thus, Diumenti,s argument fails. Given this Court's 
prior ruling, the law of bailments, the principles of res 
judicata and issue preclusion, and the absence of a showing 
that Brown was negligent, this Court should reject all 
claims against Brown. Having dismissed Brown from liability 
on the basis of an expressed insurance contract, the trial 
court cannot find him liable for a breach of an alleged 
agreement to secure insurance for the airplane. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments above and Brown's previously 
submitted Brief of Appellant, this Court should reverse the 
trial court's ruling and should order dismissal of all of 
11
 In response to Brown's motion to dismiss the bail-
ment and negligence claims against him, the trial court 
stated that, although "I am not sure I could find any 
negligence on the basis of the evidence as it now stands . . 
. . I am going to deny your motion I think . . . and con-
sider whether or not there's [sic] reasonable inferences 
that — I am leaning more toward your position quite frankly 
but let me just consider it." Id. 
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D:l i lmei i t i "" s ::1 a :l iris aga i l i s t Br owi :i 
determine t h a t 1 ) no b a i l m e n t e x i s t e d between Diumenti and 
Brown;1'1' 2) assuminq a b a i l m e n t d i d exi ;»t between Diumenti 
I IIP t •'rm? ill t h i -•. ha i Lmcnt wii\t:e d i c t a t e d l;,^  
common law and t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t r e q u i r e Brown t o i n s u r e t h e 
a i r p l a n e ; 1 1 3) t h e r e must be a f i n d i n g : n e g l i g e n c e b e f o r e 
Br • :> ; n l o m I nil ht • l i a b l e I i ir i lamac . r'|.) I a n e ; N and 
finally, 4) because Brown gave amp it-- evidence that he 
exercised the appropriate care i n h is operation of the 
a i i: p ] a i i e , 1 I e :i s i I o In ] i a b ] e i 11 i d e i: a c a I :;i • ::: t i o n I i 
bailment or for negligence.IS 
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Attorneys for Brown 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD " 
JORO WALKER 
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 Brown argued this point ii i hi s Bri ef at 20-24 
1j
 In his Brief at 2 6-3 0, Brown argued that because the 
trial court ruled that there was no express agreement 
between Diumenti and Brown, the court could not find that 
the parties altered their obligations under an ordinary 
bailment agreement. 
1 l
 Memorandum Dec is i oi i :xl: !::]: :i i s C : r\ ir t: a t: 3 ; s e e a 1 so 
Brown's Brief at 3 0-3 3. 
13
 See also, B:i : o a i I ' s Br :i ef al 3 3 •- 11. 
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